RECENT CASES.
APPEAL AND ERRo-RIGHT To APPEAL-A statutory requirement that the

reporter's shorthand notes of the evidence be certified within thirty days of
rendition of judgment in cases where an appeal was to be taken was not
complied with, through no fault of the party desiring an appeal. Heid: Refusal to grant a new trial because the right to appeal was thus lost is not
a denial of any constitutional right. Bingham v. Clark, i59 N. E. (Iowa)
172.

The right to appeal did not exist at common law and so can only be exercised when given by the constitution or a statute. Hawkins v. Burwell, 191
Ill. 389 (1901). -'Where the right is given by the constitution, there is a
split in the decisions as to whether it is absolute, or can only be exercise,,
in accordance with conditions prescribed by .the legislature. One line of
cases holds that there is an absolute right to an appeal, and if through misfortune an appeal is not perfected a new trial must be granted as a matter
The
of right, Zweibel v. Caldwell, 72 Neb. 47 (1904) ; 3 Oki. Cr. 175 (09o).
other cases, of which the principal case is one. hold that an appeal must
be prosecuted according to the reasonable rules and regulations imposed
by the legislature, and though failure to comply therewith may be caused
by accident or misfortune, a refusal to grant a new trial under such circumstances is not a denial of a constitutional right, Sullivan v. Ilaug, 82 Mich.
548 (i8go); Realty Co. v. Erickson, 143 Iowa 677 (xio9). A fortiori, where
the right to appeal to a particular court is purely statutory, it can only be
exercised by a strict compliance with the requirements of the enabling statute,
Railway Co. v. O'Neal, io App. D. C. -,o5, 244 (897); Stenographer Cases,
ioo le. 2Vi (9o5); Drainage District v. Railroad, 216 Mo. 709 (i9o8).
These requirements cannot be waived by consent of the parties, for, if not
complied with, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction. Caudlc
v. Morris, x58 N. C. 594 t1912). When the statutory requirements have
been met, the right to be heard in the appellate court is absolute, and will
be enforced by mandamus, McCreary v. Rogers, 35 Ark. _8 (88o).
BREACH

OF MARRIAGE

PROMISE-INSFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-JUSTIFICA-

TION FOR BRE.ACH-In an action for breach of a promise to marry, the evi-

dence of the promise consisted merely of the girl's testimony, uncorroborated
by the other evidence or facts, and it was also brought out that in a previous case evidence given by her was untrue- The defendant denied the
promise and gave proof of improper relations between the girl and another
man before and during the alleged engagement.. Held: The whole evidence in !he case is against the finding of a contract to marry and the
alleged improper relations if unknown to the defendant at the time of the
alleged promise, are a complete defense. Carmohy v. Henderson, 99 Atl.
(Me.) 177.
An express promise of marriage in such an action need not be proved,
but the promise may be inferred from the circumstances which usually attend an engagement, Connolly v. Bollinger, 67 S. E. 71 (%V. Va. 191o).
So it has been held that it may be implied from intimate and frequent asso-

(ON)
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ciation at the time of and prior to the engagement, Anderson v. Kirby, 125
Ga. 62 (m9o6). from admissions of defendant, whether oral or in letters.
Stone v. Sanborn, 1o4 Mass. 319 (1870).

It was recently held that inter-

course between the parties was evidence of the promise of marriage, Fletcher
v. Ketcham, 144 N. NV. 916 (Iowa 1913).
lowever, it is wholly a question of fact for the jury, Fisher Y. Kenyon, 56 Wash. 8 (igog) ; Connolly
v. Bollinger, supra.
The holding in the principal case that the fact of illicit relations with
another man during the engagement is a complete defense is in line with
tile authorities, 'McKane v. Howard, 95 N. E. 642 (N. Y. 1911).
CIVIL PSoC UE-.\fMtKT C.%sr-A school girl's father sought to enjoin
ihe enforcement of an ordinance compelling school chillren to be vaccinated. When the appeal was taken, the ordinance, hv its awn terms.
had ceased to be of effect. Held: The question of thW validity of the
ordinance was a moot question which 4le court woul not determine.
W\endell v. Peoria, 113 N. E. )I8 (II1. 1916).
It is fundamental that a real controversy must he presented to the
court. Abstract questions or fictitious proceedings will not be decided.
I.incoln v. Aldrich, 5 N. H. 517 (Mass. 1,86). Even if the case is an
amicable one. there must be a real dispute between .the parties. Berks

County v. Jones, 21 Pa. 413 (18-3).

In general, if the matter is future,

contingent or uncertain, the court will not determine the rights of the
parties until the facts actually arise. In re Spingarn's Estate, 1.9 N. Y. S.
605 (1916). Accordingly, courts will not inquire into the question of the
constitutionality of statutes until concrete cases, depending on the settlement of the question. are presented. Ilanrahan v. Terminal Commission, 1oo N. E. 414 (N. Y. 1912). It is immaterial that both parties unite
in desiring to have the moot question settled. Southern Pac. Co. v. Eshelman, 227 Fed. 928 (1914).

If change of circumstances has removed the element of contioversy.
from the case, it becomes a moot case and will not be decided; whether by
act of the parties, Lesher v. Lesher. 9i N. F. 483 (111. 1911); or act of
law , X. Y. Electric Lines Co. v. Gaynor. 153 N. Y. S: 244 (1915); or mere
lapse of time, Faust v. Cairns. 242 Pa. t5 (1913).

Obviously, it is not

error for the trial court to refuse to charge on a moot question. Johnson
v. Foster, io8 N. E. 928 (Mass. 1915).
IHowever, the mere fact-that a decree of court has been executed
does not make the case moot. Walker v. Sarven. 25 So. 885 (Fla. x899).
Nor does it become moot if lapse of time has simply altered the position of the parties, and has left an essential question undetermined. Postal
Teleg. Co. v. City of Montgomery, 69 So. 428 (Ala. 1915). The motive
of the parties is immaterial in determining whether the question is moot;
if there is an actual dispute, the question is not moot simply because the
settlement of the question was the motive of the suit. Adams v. Union
R. R., 44 L R. A. 273 (R. 1. 1899).
Some courts have held that if the question is of great public importance, it will be decided, although between the parties any judgment the
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court might render will be ineffectual. In re Cuddeback. .39 N. Y. S. 388
i896); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., Jula.
But see, contra, Chicago R. R. v. Dey, 41 N. W. j7 Ia. z888), and cf. Milk
v. Green, supm.

c
to cancel an
CIVIL PIaCEuUE-W1T.LL.S-"1 YTEJESTI?-n a ation
insurance policy the defendant objected to admission of testimony of a
doctor on the ground that he was a policyholder in the plaintiff Mutual Company. Held: The interest is too infinitesimally small to disqualify the
witness, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.Woolen Mills Co.,. go S. E. (N. C.), -4.
Up to about the middle of the nineteenth century practically any interest in the dispute disqualified a witness. This rule has been universally
modified by statutes so that today, with a few exceptions, interest merely
impugns credibility and does not affect competency, Wigmore on Evidence,
Sees. ;75-577. tEd. i9o4). Even at common law the interest necessary
to disqualify was required to be wore than contingent or uncertain, Bean
v. Bean, 12 Mass. 20 (1815).

The chief exception to the competency of "interested" witnesses is
where the adverse party in interest is dead. In this case the interest must
be legal or pecuniary, Jones v. Emory, 115 N. C. 158 (1894); Bailey v.
Beall, 251 Ill. 577 (191l); and generally certain and vested. Southern
Inst. v. Avery, 157 J111App. 568 (19to). Hence, a wife of a party is
competent under this exception, Ilelsabeck v. Dow, 167 N. C. 205 (1914).
The interest must be in the event of the action not merely in the subject
of the controverby, Bunn v. Todd, 1o7 N. C. _66 (i89o). In some jurisdictions this exception only includes "parties in interest" in which the witness is competent unless a technkal party to the action, Hess v. Hartwig,
83 Kan. 59z (19o). Generally a paid agent or officer of a corporation
is competent, Casey v. Biscuit Co. 163 I1. App. 146 (9"). A stockholder
isincompetent, Brown v. Bank. 113 Pac. 4 83 (Col. 1911) ; but he must be a
stockholder at the time of testifying, In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86
(1908).
In civil actions against a living defendant in general any witness is
competent, as pecuniary interest only discredits and does not disqualify.
R. R. Co. v. Chichester, 68 S. E. 404 (Va. igio); Iron Co. v. Graham, 147
Ky. x61 (1912).
Cox -crs-Is .%T.%x CLAIMJ %DEBr?-A city brought debt for unpaid
taxes in a municipal court which had jurisdiction of contract actions above
$Iooo. Held: A tax claim is not a debt and a statutory permission to sue
in assumpsit as on a debt does not change the character of the action
but merely the form. Hence, municipal court had no jurisdiction, People
v. Dommer, 113 X. E. ilL), 934.
This case is good exposition of the best modern opinion that a tax
claim is not a debt. Crabtree v. Madden. s4 Fed. 426 (U. S. C. C. 1893).
When the statute authorizing the tax provides no remedy for collection
the implication of the authority to institute a civil suit arises, State v.
Mto. App. 73 (911). In some states where the statutory remDix, 15-,9
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edy is deemed inadequate assumpsit is held to lie, Ryan v. Galatin Co..
14 111. 78 (1852).
A few decisions have followed the principle laid 'down in the case of
Central Railroad, ,( Ia. 56 (1874). where it was
the City of Dubuque v. 111.
..
aid that a duly authorized tax is a debt. as a -contract in its more extensive sense includes every agreement, obligation, or legal tie whereby
one party becomes bound to do or not to do an act or to pay a sum of
money." The better opinion seems to he that a tax ismerely a pecuniary
burden imposed for the support of the government. In re Farrell, ziz Fed.
212 (U. S.C. C. 1914).
Grand Army post, by
CONTRACT-OFFM
AND
C(TI-TANCE-VOTE-A
to certain propcrty examined
vote. directed its president to have the title
and, if found good, to purchase it. This vote was rescinded at a subsequent meeting. Held: The vote was merely an initiatory step and it was
not an offer nor an acceptance from which a contract could arise. Salvation
Army v. Wilcox Post, 114 N. E. (Mass.), 6o.
It is well settled that if the transaction amounts simply to preliminary
negotiations, no contract results until it assumes a formal character. Edge
Moor Bridge Works v. Bristol County, 49 N. E. 918 (.Mass. t89 ); State
cx rel. v. Board of Public Service, 90 N. E. 38,9 (Ohio mi4l. Unless a
vote isspecifically a vote to sell or purchase, it is not an offer nor an
acceptance, and cannot give rise to a binding contract. McManus v.Boston,
5o N. E. 607 (Mass. 1898).
If there is an understanding or a stipulation that the contract is to be
;educed to writing, this becomes one of the conditions of the contract. ant
a vote to accept the offer is not sufficient; there is no contract which
can be specifically enforced until the terms are reduced to writing. Weitz
v. Independent District, 79 Ia. 423 (i89o): McCormick v. Oklahoma City,
Some courts hold. however, that ifthe offer is ac2r,3
Fed. 921 (1913).
cepted and the contract is acted on, although there was a stipulation that
it should be reduced to writing, failure to so reduce it does not invalidate the contract. .\rgenti v. San Franci.co, t6 Cal. 2_5 t360); Fort
Madison v. Moore, 8o N. W. .27 (Ia. 1899). Once the offer is accepted
by vote. one party cannot refuse to reduce the contract to writing, ifthat
is a stipulation. 'McFarlane v. Mosier, 143 N. Y. S. 221 (1913).
The question of whether a vote is an offer, or an acceptance, often
arises in the case of municipalities asking for bids. In Pennsylvania it
has been held that the statute requiring that such contracts be reduced to
writing is mandatory, and there isno valid contract even if the bid is
accepted and work commenced. Hepburn v. Phila., 149 Pa. 335 (1892). It
seens that the difficulty cannot be overcome by suing for refusing to enter
intd the written contract, after voting to accept the bid. Smart v. Phila.,

54 Ad. io25 (Pa. i9o3), cf. Beckwith v.New York, io66 N.Y. S.175 (19o7),
and McFarlane v. Mosier. supra. If it developes after the bid has been
accepted that tile
parties did not understand each other, all deposits which
have been made must be -returned and the parties put in statu quo. Dawson
Springs v. Miller Contract Co., i6o S. W. 495 (Ky. 1913).
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director in a corporation

signed a blank transfer of his shares of stock, hut did not intend thereby
to terminate his interest in them. lIeld:-The general rule that when ownership of shares is necessary to qualify as a director, one who sells his
shares to another disqualifies himself, does not apply here, for under the
law, .the director did not cease to e a stockholder: Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 98 At. (Del.) 943.
Though statutes usually require a director to he a holder of one or
more shares of the stock of the corporation, in the absence of such a
statute, or a rule of the 'corporation, a director need not be a shareholder;
Wright v.S. & N. W. R. R., 117 Mass. 2-6 (1875). Where such requirement exists, the fact that he secured his stock by gift. or holds it in
tru.,t, does not disqualify him; Pulbrook %. Richmond 'Mining Co., L. R. 9
Ch. D. 6zo (1878); Kardo v. Adams, 231 Fed. 95o (j9161. And this is so
even though the stock was transferred to him solely for the purpose of
But it must be a
qualifying him; People v. Lihme, 206 Ill. .3. (1915).
bona fide transfer; In re Ringler & Co., 204 N. Y. 30 (1912).
Generally, a person elected a director is not disqualified because he
was not a stockholder when elected, if he later qualifies by purchasing
stock; Greenough v. Ala. G. S. R. Co., 64 Fed. 22 (1894). But where directors served from the date of their election, it was held they must be
stockholders on that day; Waterbury v. Temescal Water Co., ii Cal. App.
632 ('gag).
There is some difference of opinion as to the effect of an assignment
by a director of his qualifying shares. In some jurisdictions it is held
that lie ceases, ipso facto, to be a director; Orr Ditch Co. v. Reno Water
Co., 17 Nev. ii56 (1&82): Oudin Co. v. Conlan, 34 Wash. -16 (z9o4). In
others such assignment is merely cause for removal. and until such proceedings are taken, the office of director is not vacated; Savings Bank v.
Lumber Co., 63 Cal. 179 (i883) : llowle v.Scarbrough. 138 Ala. 148 (1903).
The former result is accomplished by statute in many jurisdictions; Chemical Nat. Bank v. Colwell, 132 N. Y. 250 (1892).
CRIMINAL LAw-E'nENcE-CoRRaBORATION

OF Acco.rLrCE-Vhere

evi-

dence is given by an accomplice, it must be corroborated, and by independent testimony which implicates, or tends to connect the accused with
the crime. Rex v. Baskerville, 115 L. T. (Eng.), 453.
At common law, the testimony of an accomplice, although entirely
without corroboration, was sufficient to support a conviction of one acYet it seems well
cused of crime. State v. Holland, 83 N. C. 6?4 (8o).
settled, that a jury was always instructed to act upon such testimony with
extreme care and caution, and should'not bring in a conviction on such
testimony, unless they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of its
truth. Hoyt v. People, 140 IIl. 588 (t892). The common-law rule has
been changed in many jurisdictions by statutes. which expressly declare
that uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice cannot sustain a conviction. People v. Bright, 2o3 N. Y. 73 (1912).

RECENT CASES
In those jurisdictions where the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it would seem to be clearly
essential, that the jury be properly instructed as to the accomplice's testimony, the necessity for its corroboration, and the nature, weight, sufficiency,
and effect of such evidence as required by the statute of the*Twticular
jurisdiction. Wadkins v. State, z8 Tex. Cr. ivo (igio); People v. Coffey,
16t Cal. 433 (1911). While the corroboration may be slight, it must tend
to inculpate the defendant with the crime, and it is not sufficient if it
merely shows the commission of the -offense, or the circumstances thereof.
Comm. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424 (1879).
CR11.IINAL

LAw-1O1sTRUCTING

JUSTICE-PROCRIxG

ABSENCE

OF

WIT-

NL:s-An indictment charged the prisoner with conspiracy to obstruct
the course of justice by agreeing for $5oo-that defendant, a material witness in a cause then pending, should absent himself from the jurisdiction.
Held: The indictment sets out an indictable offense and is good. Commonwealth v. Perkins, ct al., 1i3 N. E. 78o.
While the cases are not numerous, it seems well settled that it is a
crime to prevent a witness from attending or testifying upon the trial
of any cause. Coin. v. Reynolds. 14 Gray 87 (Mass. iSz). An attempt,
whether successful or not. to dissuade a witness is also indictable. State
v. Carpeitcr, 2o Vt. 9 (1847). It is not necessary that the person be under
process to attend at the time his absence is procured in order that it be
an offense. State v. Brebu.ch, 32 Mo. 2,6 (i862); Com. v. Berry, 141 Ky.
477 (1911). It seems that the nature of the proceedings in which the witness was to testify is immaterial as it has been held a crime to bribe a
person not to attend as a witness before a grand jury, State v. Hughes, 43
Tex. 5j8 (1875). and to induce one not to appear before a justice of the
peace, State v. lodge, 142 N. C. 665 (igo6). It was held in State v.
Bringold, 40 Wash. 12 (19o5), that no physical act of intervention is necessary but that the offense may be committed by persuasion, advice or threats.
The Louisiana court held that though the proceedings had not been commenced but were only being considered when the witness was spirited
away the offense was nevertlicless complete. State v. Desforges, 47 La.
Ann. 1167 0895).

In Com. v. Reynolds. supra. it was pointed out that if the one spirited
away had been subpcrnaed to appear it was not necessary that his testimony be material or even admissible, and indeed it has been held that the
materiality of the evidence is never essential to the offense. Tedford v.
People, 219 I1. 23 (1905).
Intentionally and designedly getting a witness drunk for the express
purpose of preventing his appearance before a grand jury was held to be
indictable in State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509 (1892).
CRIMINAL LAw-TRaLso%--Adherence to the sovereign's enemies by a
subject who is without the realm is treason within the meaning of the
English Statute of Treason (25 Edw. 1ll, c. 2), making it treason to "levy.
war against our Lord the King in his realm, or to be adherent to the
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King's enemies in his realm. giving to them aid and comfort, in the realm
or elsewhere." Rex v. Casement. its Law Tines j,-7.
According to Article 3. Section 3. of the Constitution, "treason against
the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or in
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." This definition
was taken from the Elnglish Statute of Treason.. Charge to the Grand
Jury, s Blatchf. 549 (1861). Thesc terms are therefore to bl understood
in the same sense in which they are used in that statute. Burr's Trial. 4
Cranch. 469 (1807). Congress has no power to change in any way the
crime of treason as defined by the Constitution. U. S. v. Greathouse, 4
Sawyer 457 (1863).
Treason cannot be committed by one who does not owe allegiance, and
so, though an alien may have been domiciled in the country, if he leaves
it and joins the enemy, he is not guilty of treason, 11. S. v. Villato, z Dallas
370 (1797), but as long as he stays -in the country, he owes a temporary
allegiance, and may be guilty of treason equally with citizens. Com. v.
O'Donnell, 12 Pa. C. C. 97 (t 8w). Rebels are not "enemies" within the
meaning of the definition. It is confined to subjects of a foreign power
in a state of open hostility. U. S. v. Greathouse, upra.
Treason against a state is a distinct offense, and unless otherwise
provided by the state constitution or its laws, adhering to and giving aid
to the enemies of the United States is not treason against a state. People
v. Lynch, ii Johnson 549 (N. Y. l$14). Nor is it treason against the
United States to levy war exclusively against the sovereignty of a state.
Charge to the Grand Jury, t Story 614 (x842).
The principal case is the first in which the question of whether the
words of the statute include one who, being without the realm, adhered
to the sovereign's enemies, has been squarely raised. It has, however,
been held that the act of becoming naturalized in an enemy state in time
of war is an adherence to the enemy. Rex v. Lynch (19o3), i K. B. 444.
The decision in the principal cae is in accord with the general opinion
of text-writers. i lale P. C. i 3: Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law (6th
Ed.). 44.
1".t'Ty-SP'CIF'C I'ros.~xce'--ox v sisOX-.\t a testator's death
certain lands were subject to a building agreement with a provision for
re-entry, and an option of purchase. Notice of exercising the option
was given but before the purchase was complet.d the lessee died insolvent
and later the trustees of the will re-entered. Held: Giving notice of exercising the option converted the premises, the property being personalty
from then on. The fact .liat the sale was not completed and rentry
made, did not operate as a reconversion. In re Blake, tus Law Times
663.
The rule that conversion dates from the exercise of -the option to
purchase and not from tile execution of the contract is established in
Eigland *by In re Marlay 11915], 2 Ch. Div. 264. For American cases, see
the annotation to this case in 64 U. oF PA. L. REv. 5M. Also Chas. J.
Sm'ith Co. v. Anderson, 84 N. J. Eq. 681 (1915).

RECENT CASES
As regards the doctrine of conversion. In re Itlake is similar to Rose
v. Jessup, 19 Pa. Ob (1852).
By a contract for sale. equity considers land converted into personaltyand
a reconversion will not be effected by a rescission of the contract after the testator's death. Longwell v. Bently. 23 Pa. SO (i8;4) ; Leifers .Appeal.35 Pa. 4-V
(186o) : Maffet's F.state.8 Kulp 184 (Pa. 1896). The extent of this rule is illustrated by Keep v. Miller. 4-- N. J. Eq. oo (1886), where the contract existed at testator's death but because of laches became unenforcible against
the vendee yet the conversion was held to control the distribution of the
estate. .4ccrd: Curre v. Bowyer, 5 Beavan 6 (Eng. t8ig). There is, however. no conversion if the testator -would have been unable to convey the
title contracted for, Lunsford v. Jarrett, ii Lea 392 (Tenn. i88o); Thomas
v. Howell, L R. 34 Ch. Div. 166 (Eng. 1886). Or if the contract is rescinded
by both parties before his death. i re Goetz. 13 Cal. App. 198 (191o).
Similarly where the vendor defaults, the purchase price in the vendees
hands remains really for the purpose of distributing his assets. \Vhitaker v.
Whitaker, 4 Bro. C. C. 31 (Eng. 1792). But there is no conversion if the
vendor was unable to convey a good title. Green v. Smith, i Atk. %72
(1738). The executor of the vendor alone has the right to the purchase
price. Krause's Appeal. 1m2 Pa. 18 (i8o4). The heir and vendee cannot
agree to rescind the contract so as to defeat his right to specific performance. Bubb's Case, Freeman Ch. Cas. 38 (1678).
EVIENCE-CUI.3It..L L.%w-m-Iors OFFENsEs--The prisoner shot a
police officer, who was attempting to arrest him. Held: Evidence of previous crimes on the same day not admissible to prove motive. People v.
King. X14 X. F- (Ill.), 6oi.
Evidence of the character of a prisoner, though formerly admissible,
Hawkins' Trial, 6 How. St. R. 921 (1669), is now excluded on the grounds
that the jury attaches too much weight thereto, and that the prisoner
cannot be prepared to rebut. Boyd v. U. S., 450 (i89i); t Wigniore, Evidence (2d Ed.), Sec. 194. But where the former crimes are introduced
to prove motive, Com. v. Robinson. 146 Mass. 571 (1888); identity, Stock
v. Mitchell. 252 I1. r34 (19ti); knowledge, People v. Hensler, 48 MW.
49 (1882) ; or intent, Queen v. Francis, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128 (Eng. z874),
the evidence has been admitted. This result has been reached by two
lines of reasoning. One is that on the trial of a person accused of a crime.
the general rule is that evidence of former crimes is inadmissible and
that the rule has the above exceptions. See People v. Cunningham, 66 CaL
(i' (a85). The other view is that the general rule is that anything that
is logically probative is admissible and that the character rule is an exception based on the common law's leniency towards prisoners. Wigmore, Evidcnce (2d Ed.). Sec. 194: public policy, Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 20
(1882); and expediency. Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, i Ex. 93 (1847).
If the reason for the exclusion of the evidence, to prove the offense,
is not its lack of probative value-see State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 27S, 299
( 8,-6)-the reason of undue prejudice to the prisoner would seem to
apply equally well to the production of such evidence to prove motive.
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On this principle, it has been held that evidence of a former crime was
inadmissible to show motive, if there was other and sufficient evidence to
establish the motive, Farris v. People. 1-29 Ill. 53.z
(1889), and it is on this
principle that the principal case proceeds.
See 62 U. oF P. L REV. 225; 63 U. oF P. L REV. 138, 9io; 64 U. or P.
L. REV. 525.

A

EviDENcE-FoA.M TESTI.IONY OF N,'ITN"SS-ADM 15SIDILITY-A father,
suing for damages for an injury to his infant son, offered evidence given
by a witness, since deceased, in a former suit by plaintiff as son's next
friend against defendant. Iflld: Evidence offered was admissible, the parties
and issues being substantially identical, Palon v. Great Northern Ry. Co,
i6o N. W. 670 (Minn. 1916).
It has been suggested as a true test: "Vhether the former testimony
was given upon such an issue that the party-opponent in that case had the
same interest and motive in his cross-examination that the present opponent has." 2 Wigmore on Evidence. Sec. 1388. Few cases have adopted
this rule in its entirety as yet, but it seems clear that former testimony is
admissible if the difference consists merely in a difference of the nominal
parties, or in an addition or subtraction, Wrigh v. Tatham, i A. & E. 3
(1834) ; or, if the property interest is the samf Morgan v. Nicl.ol], L. R.
2 C. P. 117 (1,%6).
A few modern cases cling tenaciously to the old
tests, Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Gumby, N. Y. L J. Feb. 6 (igoo); Eesley
Light and Power Co. v. Power Co., 137 N. W. 663 (Mich. 1912); but the
is to adopt Wigmore's rulepzelwicki v. Lumber Co., I56 N. W.
622 (Wis. i916)': particularly where the parties are privy in interest,
Cohen v. Long Island R. Co., 154 App. Div. 6o3 (N. Y. 1913).
.
Under any rule the witness whose testimony is offered must be either
(lead, Cooper v. Southern R. Co., 87 S. E. 322 (N. C. 1915); or shown
to be outside of the jurisdiction and unobtainable, Daniels v. Stock, 23

4.tendency

Col. App. 5-9 (1913) ; or has become incapacitated due to insanity, At-

wood v. Atwood, 86 Conn. ;79 (1913): or has become disqualified by reason
of interest, Banks v. Bradwell, 140 Ga. 640 (1913): but not when there
is a partial failure of memory, Donaldson v. Valley Coal Co., 175 Ill. App.
224 (1912).

If the witness testifies in the second trial in contradiction of his former
testimony. the latter is admissible to impeach his tesiimony, but not to
prove facts Pitts Banking Co. v. Clayton, 217 Fed. 38 (U. S. C C. A.
1914).

1

See also 13 Harv. L. Rev. 687. z8 Harv. L.Rev. 429, and 63 U. o" P. L.
REV. 556.
EviDENCE-VALU- OF LA.%-x-Co.trETE.XCY OF WI Ess-Upon the offer
of a witness to testify to the value of land, who claimed familiarity with
the property in the vicinity but "no exact knowledge in dollars and cents,"
his competency was questioned. )eld: Any person who knows the property
and has an opinion of its value may testify thereto irrespective of the
probative value of such testimony. Great discretion is vested in the trial
court in determining competency, Brown v. Aitken, 99 AtI. 265 (Vt. 1916).

RECENT CASES
The case seems thoroughly in accord with modern opinion on the
subject. \Vhitman v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 89 Mass. 313 (1863); Jones
v. R. R. Co.. iii Pa. 30 (h92) ; Farin v. Nelson. 31 N. D. 636 (x935). It
has been held. however. that a non-expert witness was not competent to
testify to the increa'e in value of land after purchase or the value of
buildings, Conlin v. Osborn, 120 Pac. 775 (Cal. 1912).
The value of land is established by implied reference to a market
The actual
value, actual or assumed. Berg v. Spink, 24 'Minn. 138 (1877).
market value may be proved by opinion evidence, Alabama Coal and Iron
Where there is no actual market value
Co. v. Turner, 145 Ala. 039 (11905).
the opinions of conversant witnesses generally are competent, Eckington
& S. it. Ry. Co. v. McDevitt, 191 U. S. io3 (U. S. Sup. Ct. i9o3). This
opinion may be based on every consideration that would influence the general buyer such as availability for cutting up into building lots, etc, Trust
The non-expert witness may give his
Co. v. P. R. R., z2-9 Pa. 484 (1911).
opinion as to the value of land in gross or by unit value, such as price
per acre, square or running foot, etc., Schuster v. Chicago Sanitary Dist.,
177 111. 6.6 (8ig).
The question of competency is almost entirely a matter of discretion
vested in the trial court. General knowledge is usually sufficient though
there is no rule to determine the question, Monghan v. Estate of Burns,
(14 Vtf316 (i892).
See also 6o U. OF P. L. REr. 283.
M.STER .At) SERVANT-NVORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION AcT-toss oF WiL

PowiR.-An injured workman recovered from all objective symptoms of
the injury but suffered from functional paraplegia; inability to walk being
due to loss of will power. Held: Loss of will power is as much a result
of the injury as any objective symptoms, and whether the cause of paralysis
was physical or mental is unimportant in the administration of the compensation act, Southampton Gas Co. v. Stride, itS L. T. (Efig.), 49.
In general, if the nervous condition following the injury is due to
the injury, the employee is entitled to compensation. There may be complete recovery from the physical or muscular effects of the injury, but a
condition known as traumatic neurasthenia may intervene, and although
the employee is competent to work, he genuinely, though mistakenly, believes he is not. While this condition continues, he is entitled to compensation. Eaves v. Blaenclydack Colliery Co., too L. T. 751 (Eng. i9o9). This
neurasthenic condition must be genuine and must be clearly distinguished
from malingering. The distinction is pointed out in a case decided by the
California Industrial Commission, Sartini v. Mammouth Mining Co, x
Cal. Ind. Comm. x61 11913). cited in ii N. C. C. A. 32 n.
If the nervousness is such as a reasonable man could throw off, then
it is not compensable. Turner v. Brooks, 3 B. V. C. C. 22 (Eng. x9o9). If
it is due, not to the injury, but to brooding over the injury so that the
employee lacks the courage to do the work, it has been held that the
employee is not suffering from incapacity resulting from the aecidenti and
that he is not within the act. Holt v. Yates, 3 B. W. C. C. 75 (Eng. igog).'
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And if the sufferer erroneously believes that he is a chronic invalid, and
his refusal to try to work is unreasonable, he is not entitled to compensation. Higgs v. Uricume, iog L. T. j69 (Eng. 1913). Every case depends
upon its own particular facts, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish
them. Wall v. Steel. 8 B. W. C. C. 136 (Eng. 1915).
It has been held, where the neurasthenia is not traumatic, the employee suffering merely from nervous shock and from no physical injury
whatever, has nevertheless received an injury by accident, Yates v. South
Kirby Collieries, 3 B. W. C. C. 418 (Eng. 191o).

It seems that such a

condition is not compensable within the terms of the Pennsylvania Act.
Roller v. Drueding Bros. Co., 3 Pa. Dep. Rep. 202 (Phila. C. P. 1916).
The few American decisions on the question of traumatic neurasthenia
follow the English to the extent of allwing compensation if the condition
results from the accident and if the employee is unable to throw it off.
In re Hunnewell, 1o7 N. E. 9.34 (Mass. 1915): Coslett v. Shoemaker, supra.
PI.EAItNC.---ADATEMENT-EFFF.CT

OF SCPSEQOITF.NT

SVrIT ON

PNDixG

Ac-

T'rIO-To a declaration in assumpsit on a promissory note an affidavit of
defense was filed setting out that a suit was "still pending and undetermined" in a neighboring county on the identical note. A rule by plaintiff for judgment was made absolute by the lower court. Held: The affidavit of defense is here substantially a plea in abatement and is insufficient because it failed to aver that the action pending was a "prior action."
Judgment sustained, Feather v. Hustead, el al, 91 Atl. Rep. 971 (Pa. i9i6).
It is usually said that matter pleaded in abatement must be accurately
stated and negative every conclusion against the pleader. Broi'n-Ketcham
Iron Works v. Swift Co., ioo N. E. 584 (Ind. App. 1913). It has, however.
been held that where the matter in abatement is meritorius this strict rule
ought not to be applied and that in such a case a more liberal construction should be made. Campbell v. Hudson. i6 Mich. 523 (18q). It was
held in Suckles v. Harlan. 54 Ill. 361 (187o). that the plea of a prior
action pending on same cause of action should be considered in such a
favorable light. It would seem that this' view is in line with the present
more liberal pleading.
That the mere bringing of a subsequent suit on same cause of action
will not abate a former one is well settled. Boone v. Boone, 141 N. W.938 (Iowa 1913). If then the strict rule of construction is to be applied
it seems that the court was correct in holding that the failure to aver
that there was "a prior action" pending is fatal to such a plea. For a discussion of the general requirements of a plea in abatement avering the
pendency of a prior action, see Eastman v. Barker, 76 N H. 277 (1912).
It is well to note that the principal case does not have reference to an
affidavit of defense under -the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915 (P..L
483).
PROPI-RTY-CO'FNANT

OF SEIZIN-fEASURE

OF DAMA.FS-DEFENSE

AND

RFIF i% EQrgvy-If the title of a covenantee, who has been in undisturbed possession, is made good by the Statute of Limitations, after rendition of judgment for breach of covenant of seizin, but before satisfaction,

RECENT CASES
then a suit in equity may be maintained to enjoin enforcement of the judgment.

Mather %. Stokely. 236 Fed. 124.

The better rule is. that a covenant of seizin is a personal covenant. not
running with the land and is broken as soon as made, if the grantor atthe time of the conveyance has no tile. Pate v. Mitchell, 23 Ark. 5go (i861).
In those jurisdictions where such covenants are regarded as in praesenti,
the rule of damages for breach, is the actual damage sustained, which is
generally the consideration paid and interest thereon. Miller v. Hartford
(re Co.. 41 Conn. 112 1874), but the damages are assessed upon the facts
appearing at the time of assessment. Dickey v. Weston, qi X. H. 23 (Mt8i).
So if the covenantee perfects his title by inurement, the recovery for breach
will be limited to nominal damages only, Vater Co. v. Fray, 96 Va. 5_9
(189). The consideration money with interest, less any benefit the grantee
has obtained from possession, is generally accepted everywhere as the
proper measure of damages. Flint v. Steadman. 36 Vt. 21o (1863); Tone
v. Wilson, 8t Ill. ;zg (876).
Therefore, if the covenantee's title is made
good by the Statute of Limitations, and there has been no actual disturbance
or injury, the damages will he merely nominal. Hilliker v. Rueger, i65 App.
Div. X. Y. 189 (igx5).
To an action on a judgment, no defense should be entertained, which
might have been interposed to defeat the original action, Barton v. Radclyffe, 149 Mass. 275 (1889).
Equity will not interfere with judgments at
law, unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could
not have availed himself at law. Ashton v. Board of Commissioners, 158
Pac. goi (Okla. 1916). And any fact which clearly proves it to be against
conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could
not have brought up in defence at law, will justify an application to a
court of chancery. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. A) (I89I). For a satisfactory way of dealing with the effect of the Statute of- Limitations upon
the vendee's right of-recovery for a broken covenant of seizin, see Bolinger
v. Brake, 57 Kan. C63 (1897).
SAL.FS-VAL1DITY-VOLATIOX OF LICFNSE S'rArT.-When a statute requires all peddlers to have licenses and provides a penalty for any sale
without a license, such sale is void, Albertson and Co. v. Sherton, 98 At.
(N. H.) St6.
The fact that the vendor has violated the law in relation to a chattel
sold does not avoid the sale. but if the act of contradicting is prohibited,
the contract is void. Singer Co. v. Draper, 1o3 Tenn. 262 (1899),
If a contract is prohibited, it ic void, McXulta v. Corhi Belt Bank, t64
Ill. 427 (19o7). unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise; People
v. Board of Supervisors. 122 111. App. 40 (19o5). Where a penalty is provided, the act is impliedly prohibited, Brackett v. Hoylt, -9 N. H. 264
(1854). though such provision has been held merely prina facie a prohiltion, Rahter v. First Xat'l Bank. 92 Pa. 393 (iS8o). So if an act is
termed a misdemeanor, it is impliedly prohibited, Pinney v. First Natl
Bank. 68 Kan. :.23 (1904); contra, Sinnot v. Bank. 164 N. V. 386 (1900).
If, however, the statutory penalty is for purposes of revenue only,
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the act of contracting is not illegal and the contract may be enforced,
Mfandlebaum v. Gregovich, i7 Nev. 87 (1882). If the purpose of the
statute is designed in any way to protect the public, though its primary
purpose be for revenue, the act is prohibited. Levinson v." Boas, 15o Cal. 185
(igo1). There is a split of opinion on whether a statute requiring peddlers
to be licensed, is a revenue statute. Some courts so hold it, Mandlebaum
v. Gregovich, supra; Banks v.McCorter, 8! Md. 5j8 (i&)6). Others hold
with the principal case that as the intention of the legislature was to restrict the issuance of licenses to competent individuals, the statute is not for
revenue alone, but for the protection of the public and that hence the
contract is void, Singer Co. v. Draper, supra. Statutes requiring that pawnbrokers be licensed are protective, Levinson v. Boas, supra.
ToRT-FRAU -- MI Sk PRsuTAlTtos-Ll.IIILTY-No liability in deceit
attaches to misrepresentations as to intentions for the future, especially
when not made with intent that they be relied on, Gleason v. Thaw, 234
Fed. 570.

To sustain an action for deceit, it must appear thatthe defendant made
some representation, which must be material to the subject matter of the
contract, to the plaintiff with intention that he should act thereon, that
the representation was false, that defendant when he made it lew it to
be false, and that plaintiff believed it to be true. and acted on it to his
injury, Lenbeck v. Gerken, go At. 6 8 (N. J. 1914). One who makes a
misrepresentation without fraudulent design, cannot be held liable for any
damages resulting therefrom, Buford v. Edwards, 84 S. H. 654 (Va. igis).
Such representations must be made for the purpose of influencing, or of
their being acted upon, Blake v. Thuring. i5 Ill. App. 187 (1914).
Concealment of a material fact which one is bound to disclose is an
actionable fraud, but in the absence of a duty to speak, mere silence as to
material facts is not of itself actionable, Boileau v. Breen, x44 N. W. 336
(Ia. 1913).

False representations in order to be fraudulent, must relate to a
present or past state of facts, and no action will lie to recover for deceit,
in the failure to perform a promi-e-looking to the future, Farwell v.Colonial Trust Co., 147 Fed. 48o (io6). Representation as' to a future condition is not actionable fraud, Everest v. Drake, 143 Pac. 8I (Col. 1914);
Martin v. Daniel, 164 S. W. 17 (Tex. 1914).

There is no rule of law which places upon one who has made a
truthful statement at the time of present existing facts, the affirmative duty
of correcting such statement when conditions later change, Du Pont Co.
v. Schuenger, .54 N. Y. S. 186 (1915).
TRIAL-COMPETENCY

OF

JURORs-HoLnERS

OF

CORPORATION

STOCK

OR

BONDS HAVING AN INTFREST-IIA R.LESS ERROR-As a party has no right to

the service of a particular juror, rejection of a juror because he owned a
bond of the defendant company did no harm and was not a reversible error,
Seehrman v. Wilkes-Barre Co., 9§ At. (Pa.),.i74.
The cases establish that one in. the relation of stockholder is incompetent to serve as juror in a case in which the corporation has an interest,

RECENT CASES
Respublica v. Richards. t Yeates 48o (Pa. 1795). The rule applies to a
stockholder's son, Irvine v. The M. & M. Bank, i Pitts. Rep. 422 (Pa. 1858),
and to a stockholder's tenant who holds from year to year on shares, Hariisburg Bank v. Forster. 8 Watts .3o4 (Pa. 1839). But no other case has
been found in which the question was raised concerning a bondholder.
The mere fact of an indebtedness between a party and the juror is not
enough, it seems, to disqualify him, Mumford Banking Co. --. Bank, 82
S. E. 112 (Va. 1914) ; Thompson v. Douglass. 35 W. Va. 337 (1891). annotated in Loyd's Cases on Civil Procedure at page 354. Where a statute
makes the relation of debtor and creditor a disqualification, a depoiit of
notes to the defendant in escrow does not establish this relationJall Y.
Chattier, 17 Idaho 664 (iq'o). It is within the trial court's discretion to
decide whether the juror has had such business relations with a party
as would influence his verdict, Moffenbier v. Koeing, zo8 N. E. Y9 (Ind.
1915).

The different views as to whether an erroneous ruling on a challenge
for cause is ground for reversal are shown in an annotation to Colbert
v. Journal Publishing Co., 142 Pac. 146 (N. Mex. 1914), in 63 U. oy P. L.
REv. 14t. The general rule is that the appellant must show an injury,
Curney v. Chapman, 158 Pac. 112. (Okla. 1916). As was said in the principal case, a man has no right to a particular man or men on his jury
nor to any particular men from whom to select, Commonwealth v. Payne,'
-05

Pa. 101 (1913).

